The King of Battle



Unlike previous wars, it was rare for American infantry units in Vietnam to operate at larger than battalion strength. In fact, company-sized or even platoon level operations were most frequently employed in the search and destroy tactics used during the war. As a result, these US ground units frequently found themselves engaging North Vietnamese forces of much greater strength. The equalizer in these confrontations was the indirect fire support which could be brought to bear against the enemy.

As a rifle platoon leader in the Airborne Brigade of the First Cavalry Division, I had several different types of indirect fire support. These were our assigned 81 millimeter mortar platoon and the big guns of our supporting field artillery battalion.

Each infantry company of the First Cavalry Division had an assigned weapons platoon which was organized around three 81 millimeter mortar crews. Each of these mortars could fire high explosive, smoke and illuminating rounds at ranges up to 5 kilometers. Accompanying each rifle platoon leader was a sergeant forward observer who would, under the direction of the platoon leader, relay firing instructions to the mortar crews. Usually, the mortars were located at a battalion fire base situated within range of the patrolling infantry units. Often however, if a suitable fire base was not available, the mortar crews would accompany the infantry on the combat patrol. This was brutal duty for the mortar crews who would carry (or “hump”) the mortar tubes, base plates and tripods along with a basic load of ammunition through the thick jungle that was our habitat.

Even more powerful than our assigned mortars was our direct support field artillery battalion. In our case, this was the 2nd Battalion (Airborne) 19th Field Artillery. The 2/19 had three firing batteries each with six 105 millimeter howitzers capable of firing high explosive, white phosphorous, smoke or illuminating rounds at ranges up to 11 kilometers. Each rifle company had an attached forward observation team consisting of a lieutenant forward observer, a recon sergeant and a radio operator. These teams would advise the company commander on the use of his indirect fire support and call in supporting fires as needed. On many occasions, the work of these forward observation teams enabled our infantry units not only to survive attacks by larger North Vietnamese units but to smash these enemy formations with a rain of high explosive rounds.

The North Vietnamese infantryman was a wily enemy who quickly realized the potency of the American artillery and devised tactics to offset this advantage. Their tactics included “grabbing the American units by the belt buckle” and engaging at such close range that the US artillery could not be used effectively. On many occasions, artillery fire had to be directed just a few meters in front of the US infantry. Frequently, friendly fire accidents occurred but these were unavoidable. In the vast number of cases, the volume and accuracy of the incoming artillery fire was a spectacular testimony to the skill of the firing batteries and to the courage and audacity of the forward observation teams. In recognition of this skill, courage and audacity we remember fondly our comrades in the 2nd of the 19th artillery, the King of Battle!