On the Way
 

If you have photographs, documents, recollections
or stories of the 2/19th Airborne Artillery,  please
contact Garry Bowles at gbowl9@aol.com

 

 

LT. COLONEL FRANCIS "JOE" BUSH


My first contact with my hero, Lt. Colonel Joe Bush, was in the spring of 1965. I, like many other paratroopers, was assigned to a straight leg artillery unit and to a man we Airborne types all had standing requests to be transferred to a paratrooper outfit. None of us wanted to miss out on the glory of being Airborne or the jump pay either.

1st Lt . Virgil Marlowe

"My outfit, the 5th Bn of the 38th Artillery, had been training for over a year in Air Assault tactics that the army was developing as part of the new Doctrine of Airmobility", remembers 1st Lt. Virgil Marlowe. "Our outfit was assigned from the 2nd Infantry Division to serve as the 11th Air Assault's artillery support. The training was demanding and rewarding. In the spring of 1965 we Airborne types were all transferred to the 1st Airborne Brigade of the all new 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile). Our new unit was the 2/19th Airborne Artillery. I was finally in a real paratrooper unit and looked forward to serving in the "All The Way Brigade". Upon arrival at the 2/19th I was ordered to report to Lt. Colonel Bush's office at battalion headquarters. It was an immediate eye opener. The door to his office had been removed and replaced with a chin up bar. This was the first Open Door policy I had encountered since joining the army. Every man from the lowest private to the most senior major could walk in his office on any issue regarding the 2/19th. His only requirement was that you do at least ten chin ups before entering. He made a standing offer of a three day pass to anyone that could whip him in arm wrestling, most of the battalion tried and failed; as memory serves no one ever got a three day pass. I sure failed miserably in my one and only attempt. At forty six years of age he was in superb physical condition and demanded we be also. He could be seen every morning leading the entire battalion on a five mile cross country run through the sand beds and over the small hills of the Harmony Church training area of Fort Benning."

LTC Francis "Joe" Bush

"Lt. Colonel Bush was everywhere during our training, conferring with battery commanders, giving advice to young lieutenents and asking for opinions from the enlisted men, and wherever he went he was followed by his beloved Labrador dog hard on his heels. The good Colonel and his loyal companion were always a welcome sight to see. At the end of our daily five mile run we would return to headquarters where we would stand at ease in formation as the Colonel ran one more lap around the battalion area. Once in a while the Lab would accompany the Colonel ,but most days ,he was happy to stand there in formation with us exhausted paratroopers and watch that crazy man go. In July of 1965 we got the word that LBJ had announced he was sending the Airmobile Division to Vietnam. A month later we boarded the troopship USNS Geiger. None of us doubted our readiness, we all were confident in our ability to fight and win, because we were being led by the smartest, toughest S.O.B in the U.S. Army. Lt. Colonel Joe Bush was truly the Father of the 2/19th Airborne Artillery!"



ARRIVING IN COUNTRY

USNS Geiger Aug 1965
Hivicdko, Mongeon and Flag
2/19 Artillery (Abn) lands at Qui Nhon
"When the 2/19th Artillery arrived in Vietnam it consisted of a Headquarters and Service Battery along with three firing batteries. The Headquarters of course, had the administrative section with the usual S-1 through four. The Service Battery had the support sections like survey, transportation and ammo or what we called ash and trash. There were three firing batteries each of which had about ninety personnel including supply and armorer. There were six 105 Howitzers each with a Sgt. E-6 gun chief, a Sgt. E-5 gunner and an assistant gunner who was a Spc/4 and a loader who was generally a PFC. The guns were under the direct supervision of a Gunnery Sgt. that in most cases was a Sgt. E-7, in the field and during fire missions, the gunnery sergeant was God."



FIRE DIRECTION CENTER

"The forward observation team is the eyes of the artillery battery and the fire direction center is the brain of the big guns that provided a powerful array of support to the infantry units engaging the enemy."

"A fire mission began with the forward observer calling the fire direction center on his AN/PRC 25 radio. The FO would provide 6 digit grid coordinates, which would locate the target to within 100 meters. He would also identify the type of target, for example, troops in the open, enemy bunkers etc. This would enable the fire direction center to select the correct type and number of rounds with which to engage the target. For example, an enemy platoon in the open would be engaged with 12 rounds set to air burst by using a variable timed fuse. The final piece of information provided by the FO would be his azimuth or compass direction from his location to the target. This would allow the fire direction center to properly adjust for any subsequent range corrections relayed by the FO. For example, after the initial barrage, the FO might direct the FDC to “drop five zero, right five zero”. This would mean the next set of rounds should be aimed 50 meters closer to the FO’s position and 50 meters further to the right of the FO."

"Based on the information received from the FO, the fire direction center would calculate the powder charge needed, the correct elevation and deflection for the artillery tube. The combination of the powder charge and elevation would insure the correct distance to the target and the deflection setting would insure the tube was aimed directly at the target. Each artillery round came packed with 7 bags of powder. If the maximum range was desired all seven bags were used. For shorter-range targets, a designated number of bags were removed."

Womack, Raiff and Frisbee
B Btry 2/ 19 Artillery 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile)


"The muscle of the artillery battery was the guns themselves. Each battery of the 1st Brigade’s supporting artillery unit, the 2nd Battalion (Airborne) 19th Artillery had 6 105-millimeter howitzers. When the battery established a firebase the 105s were typically arrayed in a circular pattern and the center point of the guns was identified as accurately as possible. The fire direction officer had a telephone with six wires each connected to one of the 105s. The battery executive officer and gunnery sergeant controlled the firing positions."

"When the forward observer contacts the fire direction center, the FDC would immediately alert the guns by ringing the phone and saying “fire mission”. Upon receipt of the call the gun chiefs would alert their crews to stand by. The fire direction officer would follow up with specific firing instructions to the 105 crews. These would include the type of shell, the fuse, the ammunition lot, the powder charge, the number of rounds, the elevation and deflection. With this, a deadly barrage of high explosive and steel would rain down on the enemy. For this, the infantrymen on the ground would be eternally grateful to the “redlegs” of the artillery battery."



FORWARD OBSERVATION TEAMS

"One of the most important parts of a firing Battery were the forward observation teams. Each firing battery was in support of an Infantry battalion and there was a forward observation team assigned to each rifle company in each battalion. The primary mission of the team was to operate with the infantry and provide artillery support for them in combat. The teams lived with and fought with their assigned infantry companies. The forward observation team consisted of a Lieutenant, a Sgt. E-5 and a radio operator who was generally a PFC or Spc/4. Each man on the team was qualified to call in fire and be able to function with or without the other two team members in a combat situation. The forward observation team's primary weapon was the 105 MM Howitzer. In addition to the "Tubes" they could also call in Aerial Rocket Artillery or "ARA", which were 2.75 MM rockets mounted on Huey helicopters. When necessary and available the F. O. Team could also call in offshore Naval gunfire as well as close in air support from fighter jets delivering bombs, napalm, rockets and machine gun fire. It was the objective of the forward observation team to be able to provide their comrades in the infantry with fire support at all times regardless of the situation."

A Company 2/8 (Abn) Artillery
forward observer team PFC. Joe Brown,
SGT. Y. J. Gunter, LT. Joe Holtslag
Lt. Michael Livengood on right
FDC crew awaiting next orders
Lt. Jack Wood, Artillery forward observer, C Company 1/8 (Abn)




FIRE MISSION


"The 105 Howitzer had a range of about 10,000 meters but was best and most accurate at 5,000 meters.  There was a variety of shells and a variety of fuses.  The high explosive round was the most common. It could be equipped with four different fuses. The first was point detonated which simply exploded when it hit. There was also a delay fuse that would penetrate the ground or bunker before exploding.  The timed fuse would be set to go off at a certain time after leaving the gun.  Then there was the V. T. or variable time fuse which was quite sophisticated and would send out a signal and when it was twenty meters above the target, it would explode raining down some bad stuff over a large area. There were white phosphoresce rounds for starting fires or marking an area.  There were illumination rounds for lighting up battle field at night.  Each gun could fire flat trajectory, high angle or defiladed fire which meant hitting targets on the far side of hills or mountains. Our favorite round but one we never wanted to use was the beehive.  This last ditch defensive weapon was one bad "mother”. The beehive  had hundreds of small darts with razor sharp ends and could be set for any time or muzzle blast. It was especially effective against enemy troops attacking fire bases."


"I’m pleased to say I once had the pleasure of observing first hand the devastating effect of beehive rounds used against attacking enemy infantry. It was in late January of 1966 and all of us in B Battery of the 2/19th were taken off the line and moved to the Catecka tea plantation in Pleiku Province. We were temporarily assigned to the 21st Artillery and it turned out to be sort of an in country R and R. In addition to the artillery positions there was a landing strip full of choppers, lots of hot chow and hot showers which we all took full advantage of with enthusiasm and appreciation. We all got showers and a meal and about dark Ron Morant the Chief of Firing Battery, Lt. Dee Besselieu our Executive Officer, Captain Michael Goodman the Battery Commander and I were in the Fire Direction Center sitting down to a game of Hearts."

"Earlier that afternoon some local kids had been allowed inside the perimeter to sell beer. Little did we know that they had blocks of TNT wrapped in bamboo. They detonated these home made bombs which were the signal for an enemy mortar attack. We immediately started counter mortar fire against every possible position. At one time we had 5 different fire missions each gun on firing in a different direction."

"Ron Morant, being a wise old gunnery sergeant had pulled the center 105 out of the mission, leveled the gun tube and broke out a pile of beehive rounds which are the meanest little buggers ever conceived. The perimeter security was pulled back and Morant and crew worked out firing beehive rounds into the attacking enemy. What would have been a wave of attacking enemy infantry was quickly annihilated. We still lost most of the choppers and suffered a few infantry casualties but B Battery of 2/19th lost not a single man that night."

"The next morning after daylight I went out and found little darts from the beehive rounds sticking clear through four inch thick trees. The surrounding brush looked like someone had chewed it up with their trusty John Deere. Those beehive rounds certainly messed up Charlie’s day but they sure made mine."

2/19th Artillery Fire Mission



AIRMOBILITY

"The concept of airmobility was more than the movement of men and equipment from one point to another. One of the reasons for the development of airmobility was the Army's concern that the balance between firepower and maneuver had swung too far in the direction of firepower. The helicopter was seen as the way to bring into balance a more effective artillery fire and infantry maneuver team. Airmobility solved the problem of the infantry outrunning their supporting firepower. This was particularly true of artillery. The infantryman over the years has come to expect and get continuous artillery support as needed. The artilleryman in turn expected the infantry to secure their positions to keep supply routes open. Without airmobility neither would have been possible in Vietnam."

"Successful airmobile tactics demanded speed plus maneuver, and the development of new fire support coordination techniques. The airspace above the battlefield was now filled with hundreds of troop transport helicopters, armed helicopters, reconnaissance aircraft, and tactical air support. Flying through this same airspace were thousands of shells from tube artillery. Fire support coordination during the air assault phase of an operation was tricky at best. The tactical air support, tube and aerial artillery, and sometimes naval gunfire had to be coordinated without inflicting casualties on friendly forces and without leaving any gaps in firepower that would allow the enemy any battlefield advantage."

"The 1st Air Cavalry created a zone system based on the twelve hour clock superimposed on the map location of each firing position. North was at 12:00 o'clock. Prior to firing, the artillery units announced over the aircraft guard frequencies the danger areas such as "firing in zones three and four, altitude 3,000 feet." It was incumbent on the pilot to check for artillery fire prior to approaching a landing zone. As an additional precaution the artillery crews scanned the skies prior to firing their guns."

"The 2/19th was a highly mobile outfit and could be airlifted by chopper to anywhere in the battle area, land, set up their guns ,fire off a bunch of rounds and move to another location within ten to twenty minutes. Thanks to the choppers we were freed from the tyranny of terrain that conventional artillery units faced."

Chinook picking up a 105 Howitzer

"The Infantry likes to call themselves "The Queen of Battle". The Artillery is called "The King of Battle" because we can put the balls where the Queen wants them."



 

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