|
On the Way |
||||||
If you have photographs, documents, recollections
|
||||||
LT. COLONEL FRANCIS "JOE" BUSH
|
||||||
| My first contact with my hero, Lt. Colonel Joe Bush, was in the spring of 1965.
I, like many other paratroopers, was assigned to a straight leg
artillery unit and to a man we Airborne types all had standing requests
to be transferred to a paratrooper outfit. None of us wanted to miss
out on the glory of being Airborne or the jump pay either. |
||||||
![]() |
||||||
1st Lt . Virgil Marlowe
|
||||||
"My outfit, the 5th Bn of the
38th Artillery, had
been training for over a year in Air Assault tactics that the
army was developing as part of the new Doctrine of Airmobility", remembers 1st Lt. Virgil Marlowe.
"Our outfit was assigned from the 2nd Infantry Division to serve
as the 11th Air Assault's artillery support. The training was
demanding and rewarding. In the spring of 1965 we Airborne
types were all transferred to the 1st Airborne Brigade
of the all new 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile). Our new unit was the
2/19th Airborne Artillery. I was finally in a real paratrooper unit and
looked forward to serving in the "All
The Way Brigade".
Upon arrival at the 2/19th I was ordered to report to Lt. Colonel
Bush's office at battalion headquarters. It was an immediate
eye opener. The door to his office had been removed and replaced
with a chin up bar. This was the first Open Door policy I had
encountered since joining the army. Every man from the lowest
private to the most senior major could walk in his office on
any issue regarding the 2/19th. His only requirement was that
you do at least ten chin ups before entering. He made a standing
offer of a three day pass to anyone that could whip him in
arm wrestling, most of the battalion tried and failed; as memory
serves no one ever got a three day pass. I sure failed miserably
in my one and only attempt. At forty six years of age he was
in superb physical condition and demanded we be also. He could
be seen every morning leading the entire battalion on a five
mile cross country run through the sand beds and over the
small hills of the Harmony Church training area of Fort Benning."
|
||||||
![]() |
||||||
|
LTC Francis "Joe" Bush |
||||||
"Lt. Colonel Bush was everywhere during our training,
conferring with battery commanders, giving advice to young
lieutenents and asking for opinions from the enlisted men,
and wherever he went he was followed by his beloved Labrador
dog hard on his heels. The good Colonel and his loyal companion
were always a welcome sight to see. At the end of our daily
five mile run we would return to headquarters where we would
stand at ease in formation as the Colonel ran one more lap
around the battalion area. Once in a while the Lab would accompany
the Colonel ,but most days ,he was happy to stand there in
formation with us exhausted paratroopers and watch that crazy
man go. In July of 1965 we got the word that LBJ had announced
he was sending the Airmobile Division to Vietnam. A month later
we boarded the troopship USNS Geiger. None of us doubted our
readiness, we all were confident in our ability to fight and
win, because we were being led by the smartest, toughest S.O.B
in the U.S. Army. Lt. Colonel Joe Bush was truly the Father
of the 2/19th Airborne Artillery!"
|
||||||
ARRIVING IN COUNTRY |
||||||
|
||||||
"When the 2/19th Artillery arrived in Vietnam it
consisted of a Headquarters and Service Battery along with
three firing batteries. The Headquarters of course, had the
administrative section with the usual S-1 through four. The
Service Battery had the support sections like survey, transportation
and ammo or what we called ash and trash. There were three
firing batteries each of which had about ninety personnel
including supply and armorer. There were six 105 Howitzers
each with a Sgt. E-6 gun chief, a Sgt. E-5 gunner and an
assistant gunner who was a Spc/4 and a loader who was generally a PFC.
The guns were under the direct supervision of a Gunnery Sgt. that in
most cases was a Sgt. E-7, in the field and during fire missions, the
gunnery sergeant was God."
|
||||||
FIRE DIRECTION CENTER
|
||||||
| "The forward observation team is the eyes of
the artillery battery and the fire direction center is the brain of
the big guns that provided a powerful array of support to the infantry
units engaging the enemy."
|
||||||
| "A fire mission began with the forward observer
calling the fire direction center on his AN/PRC 25
radio. The FO would provide 6 digit grid coordinates, which would
locate the target to within 100 meters. He would also identify the
type of target, for example, troops in the open, enemy bunkers etc.
This would enable the fire direction center to select the correct
type and number of rounds with which to engage the target. For example,
an enemy platoon in the open would be engaged with 12 rounds set to
air burst by using a variable timed fuse. The final
piece of information provided by the FO would be his azimuth or compass
direction from his location to the target. This would allow the fire
direction center to properly adjust for any subsequent range corrections
relayed by the FO. For example, after the initial barrage, the FO
might direct the FDC to “drop five zero, right five zero”. This would
mean the next set of rounds should be aimed 50 meters closer to the
FO’s position
and 50 meters further to the right of the FO."
|
||||||
| "Based on the information received from the FO,
the fire direction center would calculate the powder charge needed,
the correct elevation and deflection for the artillery tube. The combination
of the powder charge and elevation would insure the correct distance
to the target and the deflection setting would insure the tube was aimed
directly at the target. Each artillery round came packed with 7 bags
of powder. If the maximum range was desired all seven bags were used.
For shorter-range targets, a designated number of bags were removed."
|
||||||
|
||||||
Womack, Raiff and Frisbee |
||||||
| "The muscle of the artillery battery was the guns
themselves. Each battery of the 1st Brigade’s supporting artillery unit, the 2nd Battalion (Airborne) 19th Artillery had 6 105-millimeter howitzers. When the battery established a firebase the 105s were typically arrayed in a circular pattern and the center point of the guns was identified as accurately as possible. The fire direction officer had a telephone with six wires each connected to one of the 105s. The battery executive officer and gunnery sergeant controlled the firing positions."
|
||||||
"When the forward observer contacts the fire
direction center, the FDC would immediately alert the guns by ringing
the phone and saying “fire mission”. Upon receipt of the call the gun chiefs would alert their crews to stand by. The fire direction officer would follow up with specific firing instructions to the 105 crews. These would include the type of shell, the fuse, the ammunition lot, the powder charge, the number of rounds, the elevation and deflection. With this, a deadly barrage of high explosive and steel would rain down on the enemy. For this, the infantrymen on the ground would be eternally grateful to the “redlegs” of
the artillery battery."
|
||||||
FORWARD OBSERVATION TEAMS
|
||||||
| "One of the most important parts of a firing
Battery were the forward observation teams. Each firing battery
was in support of an Infantry battalion and there was a forward
observation team assigned to each rifle company in each battalion.
The primary mission of the team was to operate with the infantry
and provide artillery support for them in combat. The teams
lived with and fought with their assigned infantry companies.
The forward observation team consisted of a Lieutenant, a
Sgt. E-5 and a radio operator who was generally a PFC or
Spc/4. Each man on the team was qualified to call in fire
and be able to function with or without the other two team
members in a combat situation. The forward observation team's
primary weapon was the 105 MM Howitzer. In addition to the "Tubes" they
could also call in Aerial Rocket Artillery or "ARA", which were 2.75
MM rockets mounted on Huey helicopters. When necessary and
available the F. O. Team could also call in offshore Naval
gunfire as well as close in air support from fighter jets
delivering bombs, napalm, rockets and machine gun fire. It
was the objective of the forward observation team to be able
to provide their comrades in the infantry with fire support
at all times regardless of the situation."
|
||||||
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
| "The 105 Howitzer had a range of about 10,000 meters but was best and most accurate at 5,000 meters. There was a variety of shells and a variety of fuses. The high explosive round was the most common. It could be equipped with four different fuses. The first was point detonated which simply exploded when it hit. There was also a delay fuse that would penetrate the ground or bunker before exploding. The timed fuse would be set to go off at a certain time after leaving the gun. Then there was the V. T. or variable time fuse which was quite sophisticated and would send out a signal and when it was twenty meters above the target, it would explode raining down some bad stuff over a large area. There were white phosphoresce rounds for starting fires or marking an area. There were illumination rounds for lighting up battle field at night. Each gun could fire flat trajectory, high angle or defiladed fire which meant hitting targets on the far side of hills or mountains. Our favorite round but one we never wanted to use was the beehive. This last ditch defensive weapon was one bad "mother”. The beehive had hundreds of small darts with razor sharp ends and could be set for any time or muzzle blast. It was especially effective against enemy troops attacking fire bases." |
||||||
"I’m pleased to say I once had the pleasure
of observing first hand the devastating effect
of beehive rounds used against attacking enemy
infantry. It was in late January of 1966 and
all of us in B Battery of the 2/19th were taken
off the line and moved to the Catecka tea plantation
in Pleiku Province. We were temporarily assigned
to the 21st Artillery and it turned out to
be sort of an in country R and R. In addition
to the artillery positions there was a landing
strip full of choppers, lots of hot chow and
hot showers which we all took full advantage of
with enthusiasm and appreciation. We all got
showers and a meal and about dark Ron Morant
the Chief of Firing Battery, Lt. Dee Besselieu
our Executive Officer, Captain Michael Goodman the Battery Commander
and I were in the Fire Direction Center sitting down to a game of
Hearts."
|
||||||
"Earlier that afternoon some local kids had
been allowed inside the perimeter to sell beer.
Little did we know that they had blocks of
TNT wrapped in bamboo. They detonated these
home made bombs which were the signal for an enemy mortar attack.
We immediately started counter mortar fire against every possible
position. At one time we had 5 different fire missions each gun
on firing in a different direction."
|
||||||
"Ron Morant, being a wise old gunnery sergeant
had pulled the center 105 out of the mission, leveled
the gun tube and broke out a pile of beehive
rounds which are the meanest little buggers
ever conceived. The perimeter security was
pulled back and Morant and crew worked
out firing beehive rounds into the attacking enemy. What
would have been a wave of attacking enemy infantry was quickly annihilated.
We still lost most of the choppers and suffered
a few infantry casualties but B Battery of
2/19th lost not a single man that night."
|
||||||
"The next morning after daylight I went out
and found little darts from the beehive rounds
sticking clear through four inch thick trees.
The surrounding brush looked like someone had chewed it up with
their trusty John Deere. Those beehive rounds certainly messed up
Charlie’s day but they
sure made mine."
|
||||||
![]() |
||||||
2/19th Artillery Fire Mission |
||||||
| AIRMOBILITY |
||||||
"The concept of airmobility was more than the movement
of men and equipment from one point to another. One of the reasons for
the development of airmobility was the Army's concern that the balance
between firepower and maneuver had swung too far in the direction of firepower.
The helicopter was seen as the way to bring into balance a more effective
artillery fire and infantry maneuver team. Airmobility solved the problem
of the infantry outrunning their supporting firepower. This was particularly
true of artillery. The infantryman over the years has come to expect and
get continuous artillery support as needed. The artilleryman in turn expected
the infantry to secure their positions to keep supply routes open. Without
airmobility neither would have been possible in Vietnam."
|
||||||
| "Successful airmobile tactics demanded speed plus
maneuver, and the development of new fire support coordination
techniques. The airspace above the battlefield was now filled
with hundreds of troop transport helicopters, armed helicopters, reconnaissance
aircraft, and tactical air support. Flying through this same airspace
were thousands of shells from tube artillery. Fire support coordination
during the air assault phase of an operation was tricky at best. The tactical
air support, tube and aerial artillery, and sometimes naval gunfire
had to be coordinated without inflicting casualties on friendly forces
and without leaving any gaps in firepower that would allow the enemy any
battlefield advantage."
|
||||||
| "The 1st Air Cavalry created a zone system based
on the twelve hour clock superimposed on the map location of each firing
position. North was at 12:00 o'clock. Prior to firing, the artillery
units announced over the aircraft guard frequencies the danger areas
such as "firing in zones three and four, altitude 3,000 feet." It
was incumbent on the pilot to check for artillery fire prior to approaching
a landing zone. As an additional precaution the artillery crews scanned
the skies prior to firing their guns."
|
||||||
| "The 2/19th was a highly mobile outfit and could be airlifted
by chopper to anywhere in the battle area, land, set up their guns
,fire off a bunch of rounds and move to another location within ten
to twenty minutes. Thanks to the choppers we were freed from the tyranny
of terrain that conventional artillery units faced."
|
||||||
![]() |
||||||
Chinook picking up a
105 Howitzer |
||||||
| "The Infantry likes to call themselves "The
Queen of Battle". The Artillery is called "The
King of Battle" because
we can put the balls where the Queen wants them."
|
||||||
|
|
2006© copyright Kensington Pond Books |