HEADQUARTERS 1ST AIR CAVALRY DIVISION
APO 95490

1. The after action critique of operation Crazy Horse was conducted in the Division Headquarters Briefing tent on June 9 1966.
2. The attached critique summary includes many points of value for future operations with special emphasis on conduct of airmobile operations in rugged terrain and coordination of combined forces.
3. Elements of the 22nd ARVN Division, Capitol ROK Infantry Division, and USSF/CIDG units made important contributions to the successful completion of Operation Crazy Horse.

CRITIQUE SUMMARY - OPERATION CRAZY HORSE (16 MAY- 5 JUNE)

Working with other FVMAF on an operation such as this required competent liaison parties. I wanted knowledgeable field grade officers with adequate communications, who not only could exchange overlays, remain abreast of their situations and then brief me but also people that were well familiar with the air assault concept, knew the capabilities and limitations of the division and could therefore make sound recommendations to their counterparts in the third country forces. This became particularly critical with the Korean Battalion and fortunately we had a very knowledgeable young man there who, I'm sure Colonel Kim will agree, aided materially in the accomplishment of the air assault type jobs which the Korean Battalion performed so admirably. So to reiterate, you need a competent individual; you don't need a young lieutenant to carry overlays back and forth, he won't do you any good. You've got to have someone who understands the problem.

With respect to the CIDG we formed a provisional battalion. We had 4 companies and 4 combat reconnaissance platoons. These units were placed under the operational control of Major George, here in the second row. Major George is the B Detachment Commander at the An Khe Special Forces Camp and he did a splendid job of controlling these people, making sure that they were headed in the right direction, keeping track of them and resupplying them. The thing to remember with respect to the employment of CIDG forces is that these people are not expected to conduct sustained operations against Main Force units. Their mission was to find the enemy, report it and do whatever they could within their limited resources. It was then up to us to have rapid reaction forces available to reinforce them. Two such occasions arose. On the first occasion I could not reinforce them, though I tried to in two separate LZ's and in both LZ's we had airplanes shot up. On the second occasion we did reinforce them within about one hour after their initial contact and this reinforcement worked well. I was particularly concerned about the CIDG's during the entire time they were operating in the Crazy Horse area because of the difficulty of the terrain as concerned reinforcements. This is something you have to consider constantly.

The Cavalry Squadron of the Division did its usual outstanding job. It covered a wide range of missions and moved several times from one portion of the perimeter to the other; they responded properly, but I thought they were ideally suited for one mission which they performed, and I would recommend, if it hadn't been done before, that they be used for this one. General Norton directed that after the B-52 strike we place forces on the ground. We had people flying over the strike area and checking it from the air but we wanted people on the ground.

We gave the mission to the Cavalry Troop; they put a rifle platoon on the ground and they walked about 50% of the strike area and actually looked at each of the holes and got a real good rundown on the effects of the strike. I would strongly suggest that this be a matter of SOP whenever we employ B-52 strikes - that we have the Cavalry forces available to exploit the post-strike analysis.

We used the CH-47 constantly on ground alert, with a winch, at the CIDG Camp in the Vinh Thanh Valley. The express purpose of this Chinook was for medical evacuation in areas where other helicopters could not land. The winch proved invaluable. We extracted a lot of people with the wrap around litter - casualties from dense jungle where they could not be otherwise evacuated. I would only point out that this indicates the fact there is a continuing requirement for which a winch on the med evac Huey. And once we get winch on the med evac Huey we will be able to perform the same mission and will be able to release the CH-47's from this stand by mission.

In one instance we established a chemical screen up in the northwestern area of the operation - the chemical screen consisted of tear gas. We hoped to put a border down to prevent exfiltration in that direction in coordination with an intensive H&I program by our artillery. We refurbished this screen periodically based upon the weather. If it rained we refurbished the screen; put more crystals down and I'm really not sure as to the effects of this particular screen. I do know that the first time it was put down it affected the people in CIDG Camp so I think we have to look at this a little more carefully and perhaps test it and evaluate it and try to figure out the optimum altitude for dispersal, the amount of time that is necessary to refurbish it, supply it, wind conditions, etc. I think this has possibilities but I don't think we really understand it totally at this time.

The talking helicopter is a must, in connection with PSY Ops. We had a rallier that came in and we wanted to exploit his potential as rapidly as possible. We intended to put him up in a helicopter and have him talk to his comrades. It took a little time to hook up the loud speaker system in the helicopter and we lost the real benefit that we could have gained. I would recommend that the helicopter, the PA set, the necessary Psy Ops personnel be married up standing on the ready and located at either the Brigade advance CP or at the Division forward.

I think the Crazy Horse area is very good training ground. We cut about 10 or 11 LZ's in the area that assisted in solving a lot of unusual problems, resupply, med evac, reinforcements. I recommend all Battalions operate in that area periodically. I think a lot of good will be derived there from.

I would like to express my appreciation to Colonel Kim and his Korean Battalion, to Colonel Quoai and his Task Force Bravo from the 22nd ARVN Division, to the CIDG forces under Major George for turning in a splendid job. Lastly I would like to thank all elements of the Division in support of the Brigade Task Force that came through in their usual outstanding manner.

Q. (Major General Norton) As far as you can remember, what was the toughest decision you had to make out there?

A. (Colonel Hennessey) There were quite a few of them. I'd say the toughest one was the breaking in of the 2nd Battalion. There was no question on the first battalion - it went into Hereford. It had a mission of assisting the people that were already on the ground who needed assistance. The other battalion (2/12) - the difficulty was where to put them down in order to block the enemy. There were no landing zones. I decided to rappel forces into a cleared area and then have the rest of the battalion go down the trooper ladder from Chinooks. When the rappeller tried to rappel, the helicopter could not hold sufficient RPM to allow a good steady hover so the rappel had to be scrubbed. We then had to pick another LZ and we had to do the same thing, but fortunately the initial pilots bringing in the rappelling platoon were able to land single ships.

It was a great honor to have participated in Operation Crazy Horse with tradition rich 1st Air Cav Div. During the operational period, we were able to greatly increase our knowledge of operational techniques and we would like to express our gratitude for the support rendered. I feel that I must mention two important items.

Command and signal: This was the first time our battalion was committed to combat in a typical jungle environment. Many difficulties were encountered due to our battalion not having the proper signal equipment to enable us to carry out command communication activities in a dense jungle area. What is needed is an air-ground relay net.

Maneuver: In jungle type terrain, it is considered best to move in column formation due to narrow routes. This method of maneuver in column must be further explored and studied for further application in this Vietnam war. For unit movement, maneuver should be by using patrol and cover elements. The patrol element must be divided into two teams (patrol team and cover team). It is required that an advance be by means of the leapfrog method. A patrol team advances under cover of the cover team - then the cover team becomes the patrol team which is then covered in movement by the ex-patrol team.

On a previous critique I mentioned that an air cavalry troop can effectively employ at least two rifle or recon platoons in addition to its organic infantry platoon. During Crazy Horse we were used for a large portion of the time in an economy of force role to fill a gap or fill a sector. The cavalry squadron was assigned two primary valley exits from the interior region. Simultaneously we continued to do aerial recon of the periphery. When we have our continuing aerial recon mission; if we’re going to do a complete recon, we require the continuous employment of our infantry platoons in the ground recon role. Those platoons will be employed in some cases three or four times daily. So the point I made earlier was reiterated here and we did receive one recon platoon to help us in this role since we were in fact employing full time three ambushes – all requiring at least a platoon.

I want to emphasize that if we are going to be employed in an economy of force role and yet continue to do aerial recon then our organic platoon should be free to work in the recon role over the large area which requires that we continue to get attachments from other units. I might add that we prefer the recon platoon for one primary reason. This is that the recon platoons have organic radios down to and including squad level which is necessary in the methods that we use in our ground platoons. We were given this sector because of the access to Highway 1 so that we could utilize Delta Troop. We again ran into the problem of the limited mobility of the ground troop – in spite of the fact that we were able to pioneer our way in there with the troop. We did considerable reconnaissance patrols with Delta Troop out of the Hotel in addition to their accomplishing the mission of securing the artillery. One of the most important missions was keeping this road open. I say road, it’s actually a trail until you get down to about this point. Because of the restricted mobility of the wheeled vehicles though we lost two jeeps destroyed and we had three men KIA and one WIA. This was after the road had been swept with mine detectors which we did every day before we moved any of those vehicles. Because of the limited mobility we were channelized over the routes that we could pioneer. In other words we didn’t have a choice of the routes that we could use. We had to go down a narrow route in most cases. We lost those two jeeps since the mine sweepers will not pick up the type of mines used, 20 pounds of TNT in a box with a firing device that doesn’t have enough metal in it to (enable mine detectors to) find it, which means that we’re not going to stop the mines. With tracked vehicles (which is the point of this item on my list) we wouldn’t lose men and we would not be narrowed down to one access. We could have come out of here any number of places and it would be impossible for the VC to predict what our routes would be.

We again have a paper at Division level on the requirements for APC’s in the ground Cavalry Troop. Even though we are gradually increasing our airmobility capability we find that they are not overcoming the requirement for this troop to be able to fight better on the ground. We found that if ambush operations are to be truly effective, that planning for an ambush must begin no later than noontime. In the past it’s been felt by many that as long as you started working on an ambush operation by late afternoon that the operation could be effected and it would be successful. We’re convinced that if all the planning is to be done and you’re to have a successful ambush you have to start planning no later than noontime if everyone who is involved is to reconnoiter the ground from the air, plot concentrations, adjust them and do all the necessary work that’s required in coordination to insure that we’re in the right place covering the right routes and every man in the ambush is properly briefed. We felt that this was an important finding in this particular operation. Those are the three points I have.

Q. (Maj. General Norton) I think it would help if you would take the two extremes - the good terrain suitable to the mission and the worst case and that’s essentially the barrier where we used the riot control agent. I think you might point out the limitations that you came up with particularly in the northwest.

A. (Lt. Colonel Smith) The biggest limitation that we had was that which concerned how large a force should be put on the ground in how rough an area, what’s the reinforcement time; the availability of the LZ’s. Since we are limited to a platoon we can’t really tell what the enemy situation is in an area like this. You’re presented with the factors, all of them (bearing) on the problem (of) what degree of risk do you intend to expose this platoon in order to reconnoiter and develop the situation. We found that in order to do our job in this northwest area we had to chop off the ends of the trails exiting from the area – put a platoon in blocking positions on the exits – and put a platoon in up the trail at a distance in time that if they were hit by a large force we could either reinforce from the exit and end of the trail or in the one ship LZ’s we used in the interior. There are a couple of trails in here where in order to march over them and do a complete job of reconnoitering and take care of yourself if you hit a significant force and destroying the installations along them it would take at least a rifle battalion. If we want at any time to use a battalion to destroy a couple of east-west major axes, we could very well pick the spot in this area. We did not begin to touch these trails in so far as destroying their continued use to the VC. I think that it’s a very critical decision as to what size force you put down in one of these areas and expect to accomplish the mission without losing excessive casualties.

Q. (Maj. General Norton) Take a guess as to how and what proportion of visual observation sightings of the enemy took place from the chopper (OH-13 or UH-1) as opposed to sightings of troops on the ground.

A. (Lt. Colonel Smith) In our case over 90% (from the air).

Q. (Maj. General Norton) In the air. At what speeds were you helicopters moving at?

A. (Lt. Colonel Smith) 50 to 80 knots, and I reiterated an element of that by presenting you with a letter saying that the OH-13 is still the most effective scout vehicle in Vietnam and cannot be replaced for the mission by UH-1B’s. We found that to operate at the treetops in the confined areas we’re operating our scout helicopters it’s very difficult for a UH-1B doing its work at the altitude that we do it. Actually 50-60 knots is a much more effective speed for detecting the targets that we’re looking for.

Q. (Maj. General Norton) How many of the sightings were due to being fired at as the initial detection?

A. (Lt. Colonel Smith) About 50-50 we’ve found a number of targets on our first light and last light recons where we had been flying along and we would catch movement along the trail. Most of the engagements where we were able to capitalize on acquisitions, we actually killed a few people and in several cases put our platoons down to further develop the situation. I feel that we detected them because we were coming in low level and they weren’t able to disappear before we caught them.

Q. (Maj. Gen. Norton) What was the total number of OH-13’s employed – put up?

A. (Lt. Colonel Smith) Total number. 

Q. (Major. Gen. Norton) How many different machines and OH-13’s were in the air out there? 

A. (Lt. Colonel Smith) about 14 from my troops. 

Q. (Maj. Gen. Norton) How many got hit? 

A. (Lt. Colonel Smith) Three (3) 

Q. (Maj. Gen. Norton) How serious? 

A. (Lt. Colonel Smith) All three of them are flying. We have found, of course, over a long period that the OH-13 is not as vulnerable as a gun ship. This has proven out by the number of hits, total hits, hours, killed and wounded 

Q. (Maj. Gen Norton) Is that the results of flying at a low level? 

A. (Lt. Colonel Smith) I think that’s a major point and of course, we realize that the OH-13, other than the fact that it’s flying low, is not as easy as a target as the UH-1B, (because of) the profile – the smaller silhouette. Where we have actually lost the OH-13’s, the pilots were flying down the gun barrel. I mean they couldn’t have been missed. 

Q. (Maj. Gen Norton) How much armament do you carry on an OH-13? 

A. (Lt. Colonel Smith) Some of ours are mounted with machine guns; some with rockets; none with both. We carry 4 tubes on each side; it’s a modified H3 system. There isn’t any standard system of this type. They are mounted two over two.

Q. (Maj. Gen. Norton) How much do those help you without having to use your other armament? 

A. (Lt. Colonel Smith) We do a lot of reconnaissance by fire. Usually what we do is pair one machine gun ship and one rocket and it’s enough to mark a target for a gun ship; it’s enough to reconnoiter by fire to accomplish that mission. 

Q. (Lt. Gen. Heintges) How do you visualize that problem (i.e. requirement for tracked vehicles)? 

A. (Maj. Gen Norton) I tried to cover this down at Nha Trang. I think we’ll recommend a solution like this: We may have to set up a stable at a place like Phu Cat were a company of APC’s and a company of tankers can join our forces to fight in this area, anywhere in this Soui Ca area up through Bong Son. There may be a better solution. When we to out on the plateau there is a battalion of tanks out there but no APC’s readily available for us. I’m sure you’ll see the same thing out there. Around the center of the TAOR it’s quite likely that we could use armor to secure the TAOR and maybe even knock them off the wires around the main camp I few ever get confronted with that question. 

Q. (Maj. Gen. Norton) How do you think we ought to handle it? 

A. (Lt. Colonel Smith) I thing that I would add one alternative and that is if the deciding factor is the lack of personnel that we in fact accept the carriers in the place of present vehicles; 21 carriers to replace the air and ¾’s. I think it’s a significant point that this doesn’t reduce the air mobility in country of this division. We have yet to move a vehicle of Delta Troop by air, and yet it has fought over the entire area that the division has. I think as we continue to open more roads, more accesses, and more areas we’re going to find that the ground troop can be used much more effectively and will not reduce the air mobility of the division by adding APC’s (having to carry them). As a matter of fact, as you know, it won’t reduce the strategic mobility if we accept APC’s (carry them). It will add tonnage but that is the only impact. We’re prepared except for the back-up support to handle the 21 carriers in my squadron. I say back-up support; we would require the support from the local track vehicle maintenance unit of the Log Command. 

Q. (Lt. Gen. Heintges) If you have to the Cheo Reo area on short notice or some other places we’ve been looking at we have to go by C-130’s to move a lot of the ground equipment. It will be a little tricky to get that much lift for 113’s. You would have a hell of a time getting down there I think. 

A. (Lt. Colonel Smith) Sir, we can be in Cheo Reo with carriers faster that with what we have now, by ground, by way of Pleiku. As a matter of fact, the last time we reconnoitered the direct route to Cheo Reo (south along the river and road) we wouldn’t have any difficulty moving overland with carriers. 

Q. (Lt. Gen. Heintges) Unopposed you wouldn’t have anything but the terrain to worry about but there’s a lot of road passages they you would have to clear. 

A. (Lt. Colonel Smith) Not for APC’s. We’ve reconnoitered that route in detail and even though a trail is non-existent in some places for wheeled vehicles it would be no problem for the carriers. 

Q. (Lt. Gen. Heintges) I think you ought to go to the map and show how you get to CHEO REO from here. You go all the way out to PLEIKU and you come all the way back down the highway 1A; then you come all the way back down to CHEO REO.

A. (Lt. Colonel Smith) Except that with an APC company we can go overland, direct south, along the river all the way. There is only one place where we have to cross the river, and a carrier unit can do it without any trouble. With our air escorting them they would have no difficulty.

From an artillery standpoint there was not too much unusual or different about this operation. There are three points which I would like to highlight, however. One point has to do with the amount of artillery which was available and which was used; the second point concerns the number of missions we fired and the amount of ammunition expended; and the third point concerns international flavor of the operation. In regard to the first point, this was the first time since MASHER-WHITE WING that we have employed as much artillery as we employed on this exercise in support of one brigade. It started with the single direct support battalion in its normal mission and built up to add 2 batteries of the composite 8”-175mm battalion, 2 batteries of a separate non-organic 105 howitzer battalion, a 155mm howitzer battery, and of course our aerial rocket artillery battery. The nature of the operational area, namely almost circular, enabled us to employ the artillery around the periphery and give us a much greater opportunity that we’ve had before in order to mass all these fires as well as to fire a great number of H&I missions, TOT’s, defensive concentrations and missions of that nature. Most of our artillery was in the valley, two batteries were in the Southeast and one battery was in the Northeast. In regard to the missions fired; we fired over 10,000 missions and expended over 110,000 rounds of ammunition of all calibers from 105mm through 175mm. I think it’s significant to point out that for those units that were located in the valley we did quite a bit of resupply over the road, much more than we’re normally able to do. Of course, the 2 batteries in the Southeast and the battery in the North did have to be resupplied by air. Going back one minute to a point I neglected to mention: as I said, the operation started out with the direct support battalion in its normal mission but as we built up we brought the Division Artillery in to take over the tactical fire direction. At that time we were able to block out an area within the operational area which we gave to the direct support battalion and left them free to continue their close support mission. Then around that periphery, that blocked out area, we were able to employ the division artillery and bring in the other weapons on extensive H&I and TOT missions. As to the international flavor, I would just like to point out that we moved the Capital ROK Division artillery battery by air. We gave them an instructional period in both sling loading and internal loading techniques on the Chinook, lifted their battery from their location alongside the highway into the objective area, and when the operation was over, lifted them out. This was a “first” for the Capital ROK Division and it went off without incident.

(Colonel Brand-CO, Division Artillery)

Q. (Maj Gen Norton) I’d like to start a little argument on delay fuzes. How much delay fuze from 175mm on down do you think we used – and Colonel Hennessey – How much did we need?

A. (Colonel Brand) I believe it was about 50-50-wouldn’t you say so Lt. Colonel Bush (CO, 2/19 Arty)? I know that on all the missions we fired at Division Artillery level for H&I's and TOT’s we tried to mix it up. About 50-50.

Q. (Maj Gen Norton) Do you have and limitations on delay fuze available running a round?

A. (Colonel Brand) Not to my knowledge.

Q. (Colonel Hennessey) I would say we could have used about 75% delay fuze. I suggested this to Colonel Bush. Actually it’s up to the gunnery officer as I understand it; correct me if I’m wrong, as to what type fuze to use.

A. (Colonel Brand) Well, the observer should request the type of fuze that goes with the target that he’s taking under fire. As you know many of the missions were unobserved missions and then as you say it was up to the gunnery officer to decide what to use.

Q. (Maj Gen Norton) I talked to one mortar platoon (81mm mortar platoon) on delayed fuse action and he said he didn't have any - claimed he didn't have any 81mm mortar delayed fuse. It’s a bad time to bring this up but when we needed it we needed it very, very much. I think it’s just a question of distribution of our assets. Has this come up before?

A. (Colonel Moore, CO, 3rd Brigade) No sir, it’s never been reported to me.

(Maj Gen Norton) I want to be sure we have all the delayed fuze capability that is needed.

The elements of the 11th Aviation Group which supported CRAZY HORSE were from the 229th Aviation Battalion, a Huey Battalion, and elements of the 228th Aviation Battalion, the Chinook Battalion. All elements were based here in the Golf Course area. During the day, as necessary, we laagered over in the COBRA area near the CIDG Camp. At night we kept over there 4 Huey Deltas, the Med Evac Chinook, referred to by Colonel Hennessey, and generally 2 gun ships. Availability of mission ready aircraft ran 72% for the Deltas during the Operation 16 May through 5 June and 41.4% for the Chinooks.  That’s about par for the course for the Chinooks average-wise since we’ve been here and a little bit better than average on the Huey Deltas.  As far as the area of operations is concerned, it’s one of the roughest we’ve operated in from an aviation standpoint, requiring many pinnacle approaches, landings in gorges, and single ship LZ’s.  I think LZ MONKEY is the all-time lemon based on our experience here in the country.  This was a one ship LZ with a 150 foot barrier on the far end—the one where we lost one bird.  Nevertheless, despite the difficulty of LZ-ing, I think it proved again, our capability to handle this type of problem and get away with it.  We re-learned two lessons or uncovered two problems that we’ve had before.  During the first part of the operation we encountered some difficulty in getting artillery advisors.  The problem resulted primarily from the dispersion of the artillery.  This worked itself out toward the end, at which time we could call one central point and find out who was shooting and where he was shooting.  The other problem involved the winch operation on the Chinook.  This is indeed a grand and glorious thing and the only solution on many occasions.  But it does have three limitations.  One; if the object to be lifted weight more than 600 pounds you’re not going to get it up.  If it’s more than 125 feet below you, you’re not going to reach it and if it’s larger than 40” X 40” it won’t come in through the utility cargo hatch.  Other than that the winch is a great thing.  Casualty wise we came out well.  The division had 40 birds hit during the period; only one was shot down and that was subsequently recovered.  We had no crew members KIA, 11 WIA.  All of my people spoke highly of their work with the ROK’s and I had a personal opportunity to work with them on one occasion, I too speak highly of them.

Q. (Maj Gen Norton) I remember a force down.  I think it involved an approach to HEREFORD, probably the first three or four days.  The thing that stuck in my mind was this Huey was in that very tight air space and I got the impression that he was either forced down by the rest of the air traffic on the outskirts and he found himself shooting too low.  I recall that he might have gone in but then didn’t kill anybody and maybe you rescued the Huey; do you remember that one?

A. (Colonel Burnett)  No I don’t sir.  As Bob Keller (Lt Col Keller, CO, 229th AHB) said it was the third ship going into a two ship LZ with ships already on the ground.  He committed himself and expected the other guy to be off.  I don’t think anyone was hurt.  It may have been that the air space was overloaded.  It may have been a pilot error not being able to go around.  In any event I fear I shouldn’t have been in Manila on that day.

Q. (Lt Gen Heintges)  How do you use artillery advisories?

A. (Colonel Burdett) This varies somewhat from operation to operation, sir.  If you have an LZ which has a large amount of artillery in it, you can call the LZ control operated by pathfinders.  Control can tell you whether the artillery is firing, whether the people are on the tubes, the direction they are firing and the direction from which aircraft should make their approach.  Now when you have a lot of these LZ’s together, this is where things get rather complicated and that is what we had on CRAZY HORSE.  In a single brigade operation there is one focal point in the brigade where all this information is brought together.  The pilots are told that when they go into the area of operations to call on a designated frequency and callsign and ask for an artillery advisory.  Artillery advisory then tells you which LZ is hot, the direction of fire and the recommended direction of approach.

Q. (Maj Gen Norton) I might add to that. I think Colonel Hennessey and Brig General Wright came up with the idea of emptying the center of this area – the whole center we called BERET.  To avert accidents and to give the Air Force and heavy tube artillery maximum freedom we put off limits the inside area to Army aircraft.  You have to go around the outside and then you still have to avoid some artillery.  We did this so that we could have a free shoot.  This is a rather mad target area.  I think we should think of the individual LZ’s crucial importance.  You cannot fall into an LZ with artillery in it because you can get into real trouble.  How many different ways can you call to get the word?

A. (Colonel Hennessey) Well the way we finally worked it out sir, we had a combat coordination center which was established by division and located at SAVOY CIDG Camp. The brigade air traffic controller had a wire to the Combat Support Coordinating Center (CSCC). The pilot called in because there was artillery all around the center – all around the periphery of this thing. When the pilot called in (the air traffic controller) rang up the CSCC and found out artillery were firing from Vinh Thanh toward two o’clock or comparable information and then informed the pilots. But then when the pilots got inside they also checked with the LZ control there to make sure there was no firing going on. So this is a nip and tuck proposition – particularly in this area of operations.

(Maj Gen Norton) I remember one instance on the day we flew with Secretary Resor down to III Corps from here and went on to see General Williamson. We left that location headed for Saigon and even our chase ship said “that artillery out there is awful close – we were lucky not to get hit”. When we got back to Tan Son Nhut we found out another Huey had been shot out of the air just five minutes behind us by our own artillery. He just got too far out to the south. We did know where to and he didn’t.

The Engineer support for operation CRAZY HORSE was provided by Company A, and its main efforts were directed to LZ preparation, road repair and maintenance and road sweeps both for the 1st Brigade and 1/9th Cavalry Squadron.  The company was fully committed for a good portion of the time, principally to LZ preparation work.  Three major LZ’s were prepared, each requiring the effort of a platoon reinforced with heavy equipment.  Again we emphasize the point that our small dozer is well worth the effort required to get it into an LZ.  It does require a Chinook to carry it, but it can out work a platoon in light and medium brush clearing operations.  It can prepare the LZ considerably quicker than troops alone can do.

One point was brought up during the operation and that concerns road repair and maintenance, particularly where we are involved with a ground line of communications.  In this case we were concerned with the road up Happy Valley.  This road is typical of many roads that we will run into in Vietnam.  It’s not like Routes 1, 19 and 14 which are permanent all weather highways.  This, like so many others including the roads to Plei Jereng and Dak To, are fair weather roads and they are fine as long as we have sunny weather.  But the minute we run into the rains, as we are going to do out West in this rainy season, we are going to be in for trouble.  We are going to have constant maintenance on them and when we have considerable amount of traffic we have to have engineers right there working on the roads and also pre-positioned in critical locations ready to tow people out and repair bottlenecks on the spot.  We have got to expect that some vehicles are going to get stuck when we start working off of the main highway.  In future operations we will have to allow for time in our operations to stop to repair the roads, pull out the disabled vehicles and then move on.

During CRAZY HORSE the company itself was employed on admission basis and this of course is the best way to employ engineers.  We can get the most efficient and effective use out of them by assigning the missions to the company and letting the company decide how to use the troops rather than breaking  them down and piece mealing them to the point where they become not much more in the way of construction troops than the average infantryman.  So again we think that it worked out real well using them on this mission basis.

Aircraft support for the engineers throughout the operation was fine.  It was timely;  it was efficient;  and we had no problems.

(Major Maclennan – Asst Div Engineer)

Q. (Maj Gen Norton) Will you comment on the use of your engineers to make fields of fire in the most difficult circumstances, I know on the LZ Mortimer, I believe the engineers were used to clear fields of fire, with dynamite and everything else, under pressure?

A. (Maj Maclennan) Yes sir this is an operation we have been engaged in – in the West, and we expect to have it again in the future.  This is one of our normal missions and one that we expect to get.  We have the capability to clear fields of fire and, in addition, we usually take part in assaults of fortified positions.  If we anticipate running into complicated bunkers or entrenchments, the engineers should be right with the forward assault infantry troops.

Q. (Maj Gen Norton) I believe you were the only unit I saw out there that carried gas masks all the time.  What is the doctrine in our outfit for this?

A. (Maj Maclennan) The troops carry them, unless directed otherwise.

Q. (Maj Gen Norton) What is the rationale?

A. (Maj Maclennan) Well, we are not always sure when they are going to use gas.

Q. (Maj Gen Norton) Did you get gassed once?

A. (Maj Maclennan) No sir, but we have been in the vicinity of gas on several occasions.

Lt Colonel Silver – CO, Support Command

From the Support Command stand point there were four things which I thought were especially well done and one area which I think we should look at and perhaps improve a little bit.  In the area of especially well done; number one – the handling of the large volume of supplies by the 1st FSB supply platoon I think was outstanding.  To give you a feel for the tonnages that were moved I cite the following; by GLCC we moved 44 tons of Class I, a half ton of Class II and IV, 13 tons of JP-4, which amounts to 227,000 gallons, a ton and a half of AVGAS or 11,000 gallons and 459 tons of Class V.  This adds up roughly to 521 tons by GLCC.  We moved Class I – 26 tons, Class III – 801 tons of JP-4, AVGAS- 1,541 tons.  A total by ALCC of 2433 tons for a grand total (ground and air) of 2,954 tons.  Secondly; in the area of things well done, I would like to pay particular mention to the Chinook pilots and the 228th ASHB because I think their support was outstanding.  No “life line” was left and regardless of the weather and the flying conditions every mission was accomplished.  Now item number 3 – I think the support from our back up, Qui Nhon, and our 34th Quartermaster Battalion was outstanding.  It was timely and it was efficient and this is necessary so that we do not keep Chinooks on the ground for 20, 30, 40 minutes waiting for supplies to come up. I think Lt Colonel Leacock, CO, 34th Support Command deserves a great hand.  Item Number 4 – as you know in the past we have used Huey’s a little bit to carry some small items for which it would not be profitable to use a Chinook.  In this problem I think the support from the Huey’s was probably the best we’ve seen yet.  They flew 97 sorties.  To give you a feel for the number of sorties flown to support this operation from a Support Command stand-point, the Chinooks flew 644, the Caribou flew 12, the Crane flew 17, and the UH-1 flew 97.  There is one area I think we should watch.  When the TOE was developed for the FSB it provided enough people only to provide ammunition supply handlers  for the organic artillery.  Therefore, when we attach heavier artillery we must consider taking certain of their people out of their normal ammunitions sections and relocate them with the FSB in order to meet the additional requirements for personnel – I’m talking about 8”, 155mm howitzers and 175 guns primarily.

From an Intelligence standpoint, I should say we had a heyday with the documents that were captured. Also several of the reported locations of such things as caches, base areas etc. turned out to be quite accurate. Altogether we picked up 75 linear inches of documents. Most of the documents have been processed here and sent on to higher echelons for translations. It will be some time before we get the final translations of these and before we actually process the information both here and at Province. The true worth of the material that came out of CRAZY HORSE will not be known for several months yet. It should ultimately result in operations against the infrastructure in Binh Ke District as well as Binh Dinh Province. We were quite fortunate in this regard; primarily due to the operations of the 2/8 Cav which brought in items from the Rear Services Section and the Supply and Production Section of Binh Kne District. We also picked up what we think was the entirety, and if not the entirety, at least a major portion of the Security Section of Binh Dinh Province. Among these security documents we picked up complete dossiers, personal history statement and rosters of party personnel – cadre personnel within Binh Dinh Province. This is the springboard we need to get into the infrastructure and start then eliminating this throughout the area. Unfortunately I should really comment here that An Khe is in VC Gia Lia Province – the infrastructure material we turned up does not help protect our base at An Khe. One of the problems that faced us throughout this operation was the absence of prisoners from the heart of the operation. We did quite well – we picked some 28 VCC’s but they all came from around the periphery. We were unfortunate that we didn’t bring anybody out of the center and as a result the identifications of units in the area – in the major area of conflict – was based solely on documentation. Now this is a very dangerous way to say that we made contact with a unit because you cannot prove it and documents have a way of walking around and turning up in some very strange places every once in awhile.

Order of Battle units believed to have been in the AO: