On May 19, 1966, at 1000 hours: C Company of the 1st Battalion (Airborne) 8th Cavalry the “Jumping Mustangs” under the command of Captain William B. Mozey received a warning order to be prepared to move out no later than 1200 hours. His mission was to support a company of  the 2nd Battalion (Airborne) 8th Cavalry that was engaged in actions against a North Vietnamese infantry unit. Mozey and his men had just returned from field operations and were in the process of cleaning their weapons, equipment and getting resupplied. Although the troopers had a full supply of ammo their resupply of C-Rations did not arrive prior to their departure.  The company had to go with the rations they had on hand. At 1200 hours the company lifted off in UH-1D slicks to support the 8th Cavalry troopers. At 1300 hours C Company landed at LZ Hereford in the Vinh Thanh Valley with no enemy contact. Mozey secured the LZ and quickly moved his company out in combat formation. After having moved about 600 meters from the landing zone they encountered thick jungle growth and made contact with a unit of the 2/8th.  At this location they encountered heavily fortified enemy bunkers to their front and left flank. Mozey took quick stock of the situation.  He ordered the company to cover the evacuation of the troopers from the 2/8th. Once this was accomplished he ordered the company to pull back in order to call in 8-inch and 175mm gunfire on the enemy bunkers. His artillery forward observer registered his target and then brought fire on the enemy positions with good effect. When C Company moved back into the bunker area they discovered that several enemy soldiers have been killed by the concussion from the artillery fire and were bleeding from the nose and ears. The bunkers had been effectively destroyed. Since darkness was now approaching, Captain Mozey ordered his company to prepare defensive positions for the night. The battalion commander LTC Barney Broughton informed him to be prepared to continue offensive operations at first light the next morning and advises Mozey that he will be joined by B Company 1/8th.

On May 20, 1966, 1600 hours, three Chinooks lifted off from the 1st Cavalry base camp at An Khe. Each aircraft carried 40 combat loaded paratroopers of B Company, 1st Battalion (Airborne) 8th Cavalry led by Captain Roy Martin. The choppers climbed to an altitude of 9,000 feet. At this altitude, the air is fresh and cool. The day was clear with the exception of little white clouds, which floated below the Chinooks. The men aboard the CH-47s were tough battle-tested paratroopers who fought their way across the Ia Drang Valley during the Pleiku Campaign the previous fall and most recently in Operation Masher/Whitewing, which had just concluded. The paratroopers of B Company had learned to travel light and fast in order to close with and kill or capture the enemy. Previous encounters with the North Vietnamese had taught them that in order to survive they had to be both quicker and smarter than their foe. They carried into battle only items that were essential to their mission; there were no luxuries or unnecessary baggage. The basic combat load included personal weapons, load bearing equipment which consisted of pistol belt and harness. Each man carried two canteens, first aid packet, at least two ammo pouches and grenades that included concussion, smoke and fragmentation. For extra firepower many troopers carried claymore mines and LAWS or light anti-tank weapons that were extremely effective against enemy bunkers.  Personal items were limited to such things as extra socks, rations and toilet articles which were rolled up in a poncho along with a nylon blanket called a poncho liner that was used for sleeping. Everyone carried extra ammunition both for themselves and the M-60 machine guns. You could never have enough M-60 ammo.

As Captain Roy Martin recalls, “My command group consisted of two radio operators, Sp4 Jerry K. Brown and Sp4 Carroll B. White. In addition to my RTO’s we were accompanied by an artillery NCO and our B Company senior medic Sp5 Arnold Arranello. The 1st Platoon Leader, Lt. Robert Crum Jr., and his platoon along with the command group made up the first lift into the LZ. On that day they all had that far away look in their eyes. Every man was busy with his own thoughts and feelings. I felt fortunate to be commanding B Company. I loved and respected these good men. There was no doubt in my mind that the men of B Company were up to any mission assigned to them. Two months earlier, it had been suggested that I rotate to a position on the battalion staff since I had completed my company command time. Thankfully I had convinced the battalion commander to leave me in command of the “Bravo Bulls.”  In my mind, soldiers are trained to fight. I had no desire for staff duty, I was an airborne infantryman”.

Captain Martin remembers vividly the flight to Vinh Thanh Valley.  “I moved to the front of the aircraft,” recalls Captain Martin, “So I could observe the terrain and get a look at the landing zone. We were flying in a northeasterly direction and I could see a stream flowing out of the mountains. Far below I could see a small South Vietnamese Special Forces camp. At this point the Chinooks made a turn to the east. The jungle below rose to meet the mountains. There was a beautiful waterfall coming out of the mountains. We then started to descend very rapidly and approached a small LZ with tall elephant grass and a stream flowing through the middle. The LZ was surrounded by hills and is less than a fourth of the size of a football field. Approximately a half mile east of the LZ, I can see smoke from cooking fires. I knew that this area was infested with Viet Cong forces. The Chinook hovered at about 10 feet; only long enough for 40 combat loaded airborne/air assault warriors to dismount. The entire procedure took less than 10 seconds. B Company closed into the LZ at dusk. Weapons were cleaned, equipment checked and readied for the following day’s operation. I reported to the battalion command post (CP) where the order was issued. At daybreak, tomorrow, May 21, 1966, two rifle companies will move to the northeast along a stream. B Company will be on the right and C Company on the left. The two companies will maintain contact insofar as possible. The enemy had been identified as the 2nd VC Regiment along with the reinforced C-14 Company and the 32nd Artillery Battalion. Our mission was to locate and engage the enemy. We were to have the usual artillery, gun ships and tactical air support. Supplies and ammunition would be air dropped on request. I returned to the company area and issued the order to my platoon leaders.

“The second platoon was commanded by Lt. William L. McCarron, a first generation Scotsman from Virginia. His platoon would move first followed by the company command group. The first platoon, commanded by Lt. Robert Crum of Houston, Texas, would follow with the responsibility of securing the right flank of the company. The third platoon, commanded by Lt. Jared East from Louisiana, would bring up the rear with the responsibility of rear security and company reaction force for the operation. The platoon leaders were brave men always ready for a fight. They had earned the respect of their men and were supported by experienced platoon sergeants. The backbone of every rifle company is the first sergeant and the “Bravo Bulls” were blessed to have one of the most exceptional NCOs in the army in the person of First Sergeant Ray “Top” Poynter. Ray Poynter was a seasoned combat veteran having fought in WWII where he gained valuable experience in jungle warfare. He and I had served together as platoon sergeants in the old 503rd Airborne at Ft. Campbell Kentucky and later together in Germany. We were like brothers and having him as the B Company first sergeant was a gift from God. His on the spot training had saved many lives in past encounters with the enemy. I never had any concerns about the logistical welfare of the company with Ray Poynter as my right hand man”.

“Morning came with a hot blazing sun”, recalls Captain Martin, “There was no wind, and the air was humid. We moved into the thick undergrowth at the edge of the jungle and moved along a well-used trail and guided on the stream as planned. After moving about 200 yards, we moved into an area of thick jungle with extremely tall trees and big boulders. We continued our march and at 1100 hours, my 2nd platoon came under automatic weapons fire. The fire was returned immediately, and the enemy fire ceased. Our point man, Sp4 Milton Parks was wounded in the exchange. I ordered the artillery forward observer to place fire on suspected enemy on our southern flank. This was accomplished with care, because we did not know the exact location of Captain Mozey’s C Company. A litter was hastily designed from two poles and a poncho. We had done this many times, so it only took a few minutes. Lt. McCarron designated a squad to evacuate Sp4 Parks to the LZ we had landed at the previous day”.

“The company proceeded to guide on the trail and stream with caution. The farther we moved into the triple canopy jungle, the more signs of enemy activity we observed. The trail was heavily traveled, and there were recently abandoned enemy campsites. We recognized the smell of enemy campfires. Apparently, this was the source of smoke that I had observed yesterday. At this time, we had not made contact with C Company. This caused me some concern since we needed to know their location in order to coordinate supporting fires. I called Captain Mozey and arranged to meet him.  At approximately 1400 hours, the company formed a hasty defensive position. While checking the perimeter, I noticed well-constructed bunkers on the end of a finger of land that ran to the bend of the stream. This hill was the commanding terrain, above and overlooking the stream. They were to our immediate front and on the opposite side of the stream. This gave me reason for concern. On closer inspection I saw that they were empty, but had been recently used”.

Roy Martin recollects, “I met Captain Mozey at the stream on the north side of our perimeter. Bill Mozey is one of the best, bravest, most dependable company commanders in the army. He and I had met and developed a friendship in the Advanced Officers Training Class. His combat savvy made him an outstanding leader. We shared a can of jelly that he had. He made a small joke about something. I felt good knowing that we were together on this operation. We discussed the bunkers. Since they were on the C Company side of our line of march, Captain Mozey said that he would occupy them immediately. He would hold these while B Company passed to the south. We knew that there was going to be a big fight. His company had killed four VC’s earlier this morning. We reckoned that there was a battalion-sized VC force in this immediate area. The ashes from the cook fires were still hot, and numerous trails were found. These prepared bunkers indicated that the enemy had been here for several days and planned to stay. We were in the enemy’s house. I asked the artillery FO to place fire on what appeared on the map to be a hill to our front. He informed me that he could not, because the 105 battery was moving. There was no fire support available. I knew that this was the worst possible time to be without artillery support. We had no choice but to move since we were in an exposed position. McCarron reported three VC moving in a northward direction to our immediate front. Normally, 1st Sgt. Poynter would have joined the 3rd platoon. Fortunately, he did not get the word. The 2nd platoon had just passed the enemy bunkers that were now occupied by C Company. The B company command group, moving at the tail end of the 2nd platoon, was moving through a defilade position to the front of the C company bunkers.  At this time a heavy volume of automatic weapons fire, including 30 and 50-caliber machine guns, opened fire on the 1st platoon. This was coming from my right rear and about 50 yards up the hill. The command group was also taking a high volume of fire. Fortunately, we were in a defilade position; and the enemy fire was going over our heads in the direction of C Company. The 1st platoon leader did not answer his radio. However, someone from the 1st platoon was returning the enemy fire”.

 “At least five 30-caliber machine guns and one 50-caliber machine gun opened up on the 1st platoon’s point squad from the heights above, immediately killing six men and mortally wounding the platoon leader, Lt. Crum. Sp4. David C. Dolby, a machine gunner in the platoon, ran to Lt. Crum’s side and pulled him to cover. “Take over,” the seriously wounded officer ordered. “Get the men out of here.” Dolby immediately took command of what was left of the platoon, directing his buddies to safe positions and covering their movements with fire from his M-60 machine gun as he flitted from behind rocks to behind trees. The deep throated bark of the 50-caliber followed his movements, chewing branches and chunks of tree trunk into splinters or digging foot-long furrows into the earth, just missing Dolby’s fleet-footed figure. Again and again he set up his machine gun and peppered one bunker after another with accurate fire. But each time he’d silence a VC machine gun, a replacement gunner would take over. There was no stopping this man. He was everywhere that rainy afternoon, moving from position to position, pulling the wounded to safety and placing fire against the enemy bunkers while directing his riflemen”.

“Lt. East, 3rd platoon leader, reported that he was taking a heavy volume of fire. I asked him if he could flank the enemy positions. He reported that he could not, because he was pinned down. I asked the 2nd platoon leader, Lt. McCarron, if he could move to flank and assault the enemy positions. He reported that he would try. The artillery FO stated that calling artillery and ARA on well-constructed bunkers would kill us and leave the enemy unharmed .I asked him to direct the artillery on suspected enemy reserve positions and communication routes. This would discourage reinforcement and ensure that the friendly artillery did not kill us. I asked the platoons to pop smoke so Capt. Mozey could see our forward positions in order to provide supporting M-60 fire.  I asked him if he could place M-60 fire on the snipers that were keeping us pinned down”.

“Sergeant Gerald Hoover, one of the squad leaders from the 1st platoon, came to the CP to report that Lt. Crum had been killed and all of the 1st platoon was pulling back to the hill where C Company was located. I heard the snap of a bullet passing my left ear. The VC bullet hit Sgt. Hoover, in the chest, and he died before he hit the ground. I swung around just in time to kill the VC, who had advanced to within 10 yards of our position. Out of the corner of my right eye, I spotted three more VC closing on our position. I dropped all three, beginning with the last one first. They fell into a ravine directly to our front. I had modified the sling of my M-16 so that it came over the top, thereby ensuring that the barrel always pointed the same direction that I was looking. Based on the information provided by Sgt. Hoover, I knew that the 1st platoon had withdrawn, leaving a gap between the 2nd and 3rd platoons. The command group was in that gap. I called Capt. Mozey, who was taking heavy automatic weapons fire, and asked him to please send a platoon to cover the position that the 1st platoon had evacuated. He stated that the trees must be rotten over here chips are flying all over the place. As a matter of fact, the trees were literally being shot up by the enemy automatic weapons, which were, located on the opposite hill. I could hear the crack of the bullets as they passed directly over our position. However, this did not bother Captain Mozey. He continued to move about his unit giving orders and maintaining control of the battle. He immediately attached Lt. Vavrek and his 3rd platoon to B Company for this mission”.

“Lt. East reported that a platoon-sized force was moving behind him. He stated that they had killed five NVA and reported an estimated platoon sized enemy force was moving up the stream toward Mozey’s C Company. Shortly afterward, Lt.Vavrek encountered and engaged this enemy force in a fierce battle. At first contact, two of his squad leaders were wounded by a well-entrenched 30-caliber machine gun spitting from a heavily sandbagged bunker. Sp4 Michael G. Vinassa, a grenadier in the 2nd squad, crawled forward despite the heavy enemy fire until he reached the left lip of a draw, where he began lobbing grenades among the enemy positions with telling effect. One by one, he silenced the VC gunners”.

“Now the 2nd squad became bogged down. Deadly fire from the 30-caliber machinegun sprayed the area; and the squad leader, Sgt. Harold Kovolenko, was showered with dirt from the enemy’s bullets, which chewed the ground only inches from his face. Sp4 Jimmie Sampson popped up from his cover and squeezed off a series of bursts from his M-16 aimed at the machinegun position, drawing fire away from Sp4 Dennis M. Harley and the other members of the squad. The VC pair behind the machinegun swung their weapon in Sampson’s direction and chopped him down. Luckily, he was not seriously wounded. It was Vinassa who saved the day when he shouted; “I’ll get the gun!” and dashed from the lip, into the draw and up the slope straight at the bunker, while the machinegun continued to fire on Sampson’s position. Pulling a grenade from his harness, Vinassa bent low and hurled himself across the last 30 feet into the machinegun’s muzzle. It swung in his direction just as Vinassa chucked the grenade in an underhanded throw through the firing aperture. The muzzle was aimed right at the heroic grenadier, and he caught the blast in the chest. A moment later, an explosion erupted within the machinegun position then smoke and dust burst from the bunker. Sp4 Vinassa was dead when the troopers of the 2nd squad reached his side in their rush up the hill. Two VC machine gunners lay slumped across their weapons in a bunker jammed with full ammo belts”.

“Further up the hill, 1st Sgt. Poynter, who had been following the 1st platoon with platoon sergeant William Robinson and a couple of riflemen, found themselves in the path of several VC that were following Sp4 Dolby and other withdrawing members of the 1st platoon. Sfc Robinson took a VC round in the magazine of his M-16. 1st Sgt. Poynter fired into the advancing enemy, killing several VC. One VC dropped his weapon and ran back up the trail 1st Sgt. Ray Poynter’s combat experience combined with courage and fast action saved the withdrawing members of the 1st platoon. He would hold the position until later that night when Lt. East’s platoon closed on that location. At this time, a re-supply drop that had been ordered by Capt. Mozey came falling through the jungle canopy. It landed between the position held by Poynter and the bunkers occupied by Mozey. The re-supply drop was timely, in that we were running out of ammunition. Some of this came close to hitting some of the men”.

“Lt. McCarron returned with the 2nd platoon,” recalls Roy Martin “and reports that he could not flank the enemy positions because he had encountered heavy enemy fire from the front and the left. He reported that he had not received any fire from the right and that there may be a gap in the enemy positions. I told him, “follow me, we are going to attack”. Only half of our mission had been accomplished, the “close with” part. We had killed some of them, but not nearly the number we were going to kill. Lt. East’s platoon, Lt.Vavrek’s platoon, the action of Sgt. Poynter, and the supporting fire provided by Capt. Mozey, combined with the fact that he occupied the positions that the VC had planned to be in at this time; presented the perfect conditions for us to attack. Based on Lt. McCarran’s report and what I saw, the weakness in the enemy defense was a draw and the steep side of the hill. We would crawl up the side of the hill, under the cover of the supporting fire, and break through the bunker line. At about this time, the battalion S-3 wanted to know what we planned to do. White answered, “Six says we are going to attack.” This RTO had learned to read my mind. Fortunately, the rain was falling hard and darkness was coming. This, combined with Capt. Mozey’s covering fire, enabled us to crawl up a steep hill. We crawled through the first line of bunkers unnoticed”.

“I called for Capt. Mozey to raise his M-60 fire to the top of the hill. We continued up the hill until we were well above the enemy defensive positions. We discovered several communication wires running down the hill to the bunkers. Platoon Sgt. James L. Johnson cut these wires. He and Sgt. Arsenio D. Lujan would provide rear security, while the remainder of the 2nd platoon and the command group attacked the bunkers”.

“I asked Capt. Mozey to ceasefire. It was getting darker, and we could barely see. The C Company artillery FO was adjusting flares fired by his unit. In addition, he called for a flare ship. I saw an AK-47 pointing around the left side of a tree, an indication that the owner was left-handed. I pulled the pin of the grenade that I was holding to throw into the bunker that he was guarding. I counted 1,000, 2,000, then lobbed the grenade. It exploded just as it passed his head. The explosion blew him clear of the tree; he appeared to be very small and very dead. I rushed the bunker before the enemy had time to react and tossed a grenade through the door. Following the explosion, I heard moaning and scuffling sounds coming from the bunker”.

“Off to my left, a VC machinegun crew opened fire on Lt. McCarron, hitting his RTO, Sp4 Allen Ritter. McCarron charged the position, firing his M-16 and killing the gunner, his assistant and the ammo bearer. He then charged the bunker, destroying it and killing the remaining occupants with a grenade. I did not hear any more firing after this. Aided by the light provided by flares, we moved from bunker to bunker, killing the occupants with well-placed grenades and carefully aimed M-16 fire. When we destroyed the last bunker, we joined Johnson and Lujan back up the trail.  The silence after a firefight is awesome, and the feeling is unexplainable. I heard a VC chattering as he came up the trail. A flare drop exposed him, and he was headed straight for Sgt. Lopez. My M-16 was jammed. Lopez killed him with one shot. The VC was carrying one of our old 50-caliber machine guns, no doubt captured from one of the ARVN outposts. The flare ships remained on station and the artillery FO continued to drop flares for much needed light. By this time, it was very quiet. The smell of grenade and gunpowder filled the air, and it continued to rain”.

“I asked Lt. McCarron to provide security, while I searched the area for any wounded or missing. Since the position held by C Company provided the best terrain for security, and the fact that my 1st platoon, including the dead and wounded, had closed into that position three hours ago, we decided to close into his position for the night. We moved down the hill where we met 1st SGT Poynter, Lt.Vavrek, Lt. East and their platoons. I ordered Lt. Vavrek to take his men and move up the steep slope and join C Company. Lt. East and his platoon would follow. Lt. McCarron and his raiders would cover the movement. We closed into the position at 0100 hours, May 22, 1966. The medics were treating the wounded under the watchful eye of Capt. Mozey and Lt. Jon Williams. The credit for evacuating the wounded goes to Lt. Williams’ platoon. They had been evacuating the wounded during the entire firefight. They did this under fire and with bravery and compassion found in few men. Unfortunately, they were never given the credit that they deserved. Pfc. David McCallum, a medic attached to C Company deserves special recognition for his untiring efforts to treat and comfort the wounded”.

Capt. Mozey met me as I came to his perimeter and guided me to the CP, where I found 1st Sgt. Poynter. I was totally exhausted. We had fought the good fight, and we had defeated the enemy in his own house. The few remaining VC had gathered some of their dead and retreated. We took roll call and found that Lt. Robert Crum and Pfc. Angel Rodriguez were missing. Since they had been reported KIA and I had personally searched the area where they were last seen, we decided to recover the bodies at first light. There was no further enemy activity this night. At first light, Lt.Vavrek’s platoon and Sp4 David Dolby with his buddy, Pfc. Kenneth Fernandez, recovered the two missing troopers, Lt. Crum and Pfc. Rodriguez. A chain saw was lowered through the jungle canopy and used to clear a small opening to evacuate the wounded and dead. The casualties were hoisted up to a hovering CH-47, using a basket designed for this purpose. The wounded were evacuated first, followed by our dead and then captured enemy weapons and equipment that may have intelligence value. Thanks to the CH-47 crew and their extraction procedures, the lives of many of our seriously wounded were saved. This action took most of the morning”.

Captain Mozey then moved his company out to continue the attack and sweep the battle area. Mozey reported counting 58 VC bodies and observed bloody trails where some of the dead and wounded had been carried away. He reported finding the fully dressed body of a high-ranking Chinese officer in the command bunker. He also found several other bodies of NVA Officers buried in shallow graves. The VC had made a hasty retreat leaving behind more than 58 bodies and numerous weapons, including three 50-caliber machine guns. This was proof positive that the enemy had taken a very severe beating since it was their practice never to leave behind their dead and wounded unless absolutely necessary”.

“We shored up our defense, regrouped and continued to evacuate the enemy weapons and equipment. The company remained in place overnight because it was a good defensive position and we could readily move to support C Company should they need our help. The obviously defeated VC had broken contact and our mission had been successfully concluded in this area. The next morning we moved to the LZ and were air lifted to a battalion firebase for refitting and resupply”.

Once again the “Jumping Mustangs” of the 1st battalion 8th Cavalry had been tested in combat and not found wanting. Although the number of casualties was great they were far fewer then the number of heroes born of that terrible battle. This was not a battle won by individuals. This was a battle fought and won by two well-trained and motivated companies of airborne infantry that aggressively seized the initiative and defeated a well-positioned and fortified enemy. Three men of the 1st Battalion (Airborne) 8th Cavalry were singled out for their extraordinary actions during this engagement. Captain Roy Martin was awarded our nation’s second highest combat decoration, The Distinguished Service Cross, as was Sp4 Michael Vinassa whose decoration was awarded posthumously. David Dolby received our nation’s highest award for his actions that day, the Medal of Honor. Five men were awarded the Silver Star, six received the Bronze Star with “V” Device and dozens earned the Purple Heart. All these men wear their decorations with pride and the modesty of true heroes claiming only to be representatives of all those brave soldiers who fought which such honor and courage in the dark green jungle of the Vinh Thanh Valley.

Map of the battle drawn by Bill McCarron